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Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for 
Environmental Goods? Implication for aggregate welfare measures 
 
Abstract  
The aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived 
from a contingent valuation (CV) survey will be much higher if the same elicited mean 
willingness to pay (WTP) is added up over individuals rather than households. A trivial 
fact, however, once respondents are part of multi-person households it becomes almost 
impossible to elicit an “uncontaminated” WTP measure that with some degree of 
confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit. The literature is 
mostly silent about which response unit to use in WTP questions and in some CV 
studies it is even unclear which type has actually been applied. We test for differences 
between individual and household WTP in a novel, web-administered, split-sample CV 
survey asking WTP for preserving biodiversity in old-growth coniferous forests in 
Norway. Two samples are asked both types of questions, but in reverse order, followed 
by a question with an item battery trying to reveal why WTP may differ. We find in a 
between-sample test that the WTP respondents state on behalf of their households is not 
significantly different from their individual WTP. However, within the same sample, 
household WTP is significantly higher than individual WTP; in particular if respondents 
are asked to state individual before household WTP. Our results suggest that using 
individual WTP as the response unit would overestimate aggregate WTP, and thus bias 
welfare estimates in benefit-cost analyses. Thus, the choice of response format needs to 
be explicitly and carefully addressed in CV questionnaire design in order to avoid the 
risk of unprofitable projects passing the benefit-cost test. 
Keywords: Contingent valuation, household, individual, WTP; JEL Classification: 
Q51, H41  
  3 
Introduction 
The aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived 
from a contingent valuation (CV) survey will be much higher if the same elicited mean 
willingness to pay (WTP) is added up over (adult) individuals rather than households. A 
trivial fact, however, once respondents are part of multi-person households, it becomes 
almost impossible to elicit an “uncontaminated” WTP measure that with some degree of 
confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit (e.g. Quiggin (1998), 
Bateman and Munro (2006)). The correct unit will not only depend on how and to 
whom the WTP question is phrased, but on the respondent’s self-perceived agency and 
the type of resource allocation model prevailing in her2 household (Delaney and 
O'Toole 2006; Strand 2007). Failing to appreciate this problem has important 
implications for the credibility of welfare estimates from CV studies, and stated 
preference research more generally (as for example acknowledged by Boyle (2003))3. 
The response unit issue has received little attention in the otherwise extensive CV 
literature, though resulting response unit biases in welfare estimates could be even 
higher than other more “high-profile” CV biases, summarised for example in Carson et 
al (2001). The result is an ambiguous and ill-informed CV practice applying a mix of 
approaches asking respondents for their personal WTP, their WTP on behalf of the 
household, or even leaving the unit unspecified in the WTP questions. No primary 
valuation studies we have seen, not even high-budget best practice studies such as 
Banzhaf et al (2006), investigate the sensitivity of welfare estimates to the implicit 
                                                 
2
 The gender-neutral way of varying the pronoun may be confusing in a paper on household preferences, where 
gender differences are well known. However, no such differences are intended unless explicitly stated.  
3
 In fact, this is part of a wider problem as traditional microeconomics typically leave the definition of the 
“consumer” rather obscure – treating households and individual consumers the same (Vermeulen 2002). 
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assumptions about household decision-making underlying the choice of response unit4. 
Referring to CV case studies in the context of household decision-making models both 
in developing and developed countries, Smith and Van Houtven (2004: p164)  state that: 
“What is missing in all these cases is a systematic documentation of the consequences of 
using one set of maintained assumptions versus another to organize observed choices 
and estimate benefits people receive from improvements in environmental quality. The 
collective model offers one such perspective”.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical consequences of the choice of 
response unit – household or individual – and to inform the theoretical debate about 
household decision-making models in the context of CV of environmental goods. We 
attempt to answer the following questions: (1) What is the relationship between mean 
individual and mean household WTP?; (2) Do respondents within the same sample 
change their WTP when prompted instead to state individual or household WTP, and if 
so what are their stated reasons?; and finally; (3) Can household and respondent 
characteristics explain the observed relationship between household and individual 
WTP? The spill over and use of models from the large household decision-making 
literature to answer such questions has been limited to date within environmental 
valuation research. No generally agreed theoretical framework to analyse household 
decision-making in environmental valuation has been developed, though some attempts 
have been made (notably Quiggin (1998), Bergstrom (2003), Strand (2005; 2007), 
Smith and Van Houtven (1998; 2004), Munro (2005) and Bateman and Munro (2003)). 
We compare Strand’s (2007) collective household decision model, which predicts that 
                                                 
4
 A few, limited benefit transfer studies have realised the potentially large implications for aggregation if WTP 
estimates are assumed to be for households or individuals.   
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response unit bias may actually not be a problem in large samples, with other models 
deriving hypotheses we test within and between samples. This paper is, to our 
knowledge, the first empirical contribution investigating the relationship between 
household and individual WTP for CV of environmental goods. Our study also 
supplements the results from a few limited empirical studies for other types of goods 
(e.g. TV broadcasting, health risks) or valuation methods (choice experiments) 
(Bateman and Munro 2006; Beharry and Scarpa 2006; Delaney and O'Toole 2006; 
Hasler et al. 2008; Delaney and O'Toole In press). Compared to previous research, we 
add several new and interesting dimensions: (1) Core elements of our CV questionnaire 
(e.g. type of good, scenario, payment vehicle, budget reminders) are consistent with 
eliciting both household and individual WTP from individual respondents; (2) Within 
this framework, all respondents are given both household and individual WTP 
questions, but the order is varied between samples, offering a clean test of differences in 
WTP from these two response units; finally (3) We utilise both respondents’ stated 
reasons and a CV dataset supplemented with information from a pre-recruited web 
panel of respondents to explain the observed differences in individual and household 
WTP. We find that people state a higher WTP on behalf of the household than as 
individuals, though this difference is not significant at the 5 % level. However, when 
people are prompted to answer using the other response unit, the WTP difference 
increases, especially if they have been asked individual WTP first. Results suggest that 
response unit uncertainty may continue to be a source of substantial noise in aggregate 
welfare estimates, unless the issue is much more carefully addressed in survey design 
and testing. 
  6 
Theoretical framework and empirical expectations 
Theoretical framework 
In their landmark book on CV, Mitchell and Carson (1989: p265-266) advise for pure 
public goods simply to “allow an adult who claims to be the household head” to state 
WTP on behalf of the household5. In a footnote they refer to Becker (1981) for 
implications of using household as the unit of analysis. Subsequent CV guidance 
documents have continued to treat lightly the appropriate response unit and potential 
implications of this choice (Arrow et al. 1993; Bateman et al. 2002; SEPA 2006). The 
literature that has developed in the area of family economics building on Nobel laureate 
Gary Becker’s early contributions in the 1970s (Pollak 2003), give insights of 
potentially great significance also for environmental valuation research. This literature 
studies models of resource allocation in the family and how the effects of government 
policies depend on the dynamics of household decision-making (see e.g. Bergstrom 
(1994) and Vermeulen (2002) for reviews). The models are often divided into either 
unitary or collective. In the unitary model household choices can be described as if they 
were made by a single individual (Samuelson 1956; Becker 1973), the traditional 
assumption which greatly simplifies economic analysis of consumer behaviour, 
                                                 
5
 The reasons Mitchell and Carson put forward for this advice were in our view both misguided. First, they claimed 
that most payments for pure public goods are made at the household level, using income tax as an example. But 
income tax was always measured out and paid individually. Second, they claimed that choosing a household head 
was the U.S. Census Bureau practice at the time, though this rather archaic practice was abandoned already in 
1980 partly due to feminist critique (Presser 1998). For quasi-private goods such as hunting Mitchell and Carson 
recommends eliciting individual WTP. 
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including CV research6. Mitchell and Carson’s “household head” would, based on this 
model state the WTP that maximises the utility of the household. A feature of the 
unitary model is income pooling among household members, meaning that the source of 
income does not influence consumption decisions. The unitary model has come under 
fire in a large number of studies both in developing and developed countries (see e.g. 
Vermeulen (2002)), and is increasingly being replaced by what is known as collective 
models. Collective models allow for the fact that households often consist of several 
members who may have different preferences so that resource allocations are 
determined by some sort of cooperative (Pareto efficient) or non-cooperative bargaining 
among the members. In a typical CV survey a random household member7 would be 
asked WTP for a (small) change in the provision of an environmental good in one of 
two main ways8:  
(I) What is your maximum individual (or personal) WTP (on your own behalf)?; or  
(II) What is your maximum WTP on behalf of your household (or your household’s 
maximum WTP)?9  
                                                 
6
 This outcome results either from imposing a structure on the household decision-making problem so that the 
household utility function reduces to one (Samuelson), or through an altruistic (benevolent) head optimally 
allocating household resources (Becker). 
7
 In some CV surveys the person identified as responsible for paying certain household expenses is taken to be the 
relevant decision maker, and answer on behalf on the household (e.g. like in Hensher et al. (2005)). 
8
 The third way, not specifying the unit, as for example done in Delaney and O’Toole (2006), would in general not be 
advisable. Further, in English “you” which does not refer to an explicitly stated unit introduces an ambiguity in 
that there is no difference between plural and singular interpretation.  
9
 We use the open ended WTP question format here, but what we write would naturally extend to other formats, such 
as dichotomous choice.  
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In CV studies, WTP from question I would normally be aggregated over individuals, 
and from II over households10. A commonly held view based on very little actual 
evidence, as pointed out by Strand (2007), is that the answer to II is higher than to I, but 
only if the respondent shows interpersonal preferences, such as altruism, towards the 
other household members. If there are no such preferences, respondents are seen to 
under represent household WTP, i.e. answers to I and II are (more) equal. In this case, 
aggregating WTP over households would grossly underestimate the total welfare 
change. But what does current theory and empirical results actually tell us to expect? To 
answer this question and clarify some of the confusion in the literature, it is useful to 
introduce some notation11. Let: hwtp = the maximum amount a household would be 
WTP for a change in the provision of the environmental good, so that all household 
members’ utility levels are unchanged; iwtpi = household member i’s response to WTP 
question I; and hwtpi = household member i’s response to WTP question II.  
In typical CV surveys, hwtp is unobservable, since what is observed is only a random 
household member i’s representation12, hwtpi. Even if hwtpi is truthfully given, it may 
vary with which household member is asked (or misrepresent hwtp if given by a 
household head), and is therefore generally not equal to hwtp. For one-person 
households iwtpi should be equal to hwtpi, which in this case equals hwtp by definition. 
The relationship between iwtpi and hwtpi on the one hand and hwtp on the other for 
multi-person households, is, however, not trivial. The most advanced attempt to 
investigate household decision making in this context is Strand (2007). He presents a 
collective model with no altruism assuming that the “true” hwtp is measured as the sum 
                                                 
10
 This may seem obvious, but we state it here since there is actually some confusion in the literature on this point. 
11
 Inspired by Munro (2005). 
12
 To the extent that the researcher can control who actually answers the survey. 
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of the adult household members’ individual WTP (suppressing the summation index: 
∑iwtp,) i.e. each adult members’ reply to WTP question I above13:   
(1) wtpiiwtphwtp
m
1i
i
∑∑ ≡≡
=
     , where the household has m (adult) members14.  
Strand’s model assumes that the household allocates resources in efficient Nash 
bargains over a private and a household good (i.e. a good consumed commonly within 
the household). He then argues that WTP question I is most reasonably interpreted as 
member i’s willingness to give up units of his privately consumed good for the increase 
in the public good. Question II, on the other hand, is interpreted as member i’s trade-off 
between the household good and the public good. An implication of the model, is that in 
the bargaining solution individual i is always willing to give up more of the household 
good than of his private good, or:  
(2) ii iwtphwtp >   
                                                 
13
 In contrast to Strand, Quiggin (1998) and Bateman and Munro (2006) consider hwtp to be WTP obtained by 
consensus if adult household members are asked question II jointly. However, this intepretation makes implicit 
assumptions about the household bargaining structure allowing a consensus to be made in a stated preference 
survey setting. For example, it is unclear how consensus about hwtp could be achieved in a non-cooperative 
setting. Further, Bateman and Munro (2006: p3) state that “In one treatment a randomly selected individual is 
chosen from the couple and takes part in a face-to-face interview, providing responses on behalf of the 
household”. [our italics]. This is what B&M call “individual WTP”, in our terminology hwtpi, which they sum to 
an aggregate hwtp measure. In our setup, this would only make sense for iwtpi (equation (1)). However, this 
imprecision may be due the income pooling model assumed in their study, in which the distinction between WTP 
questions I and II becomes immaterial (see equation (5) below).  
14
 Strand assumes in his basic model two adult household members only, but his results extend to more than two 
members, so we take the general case here. 
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The intuition for (2) is as follows. A small increase in common household income can 
be spent either on the private goods or the household good. In the bargaining solution, 
each member only receives a fraction to spend on the private good, and since in 
optimum the marginal consumption value of both types of goods must be equal, it 
follows that each member’s marginal utility of the household good is lower than for the 
private good. (2) is the first theoretical prediction we will test in our data. Note that this 
result does not arise because of altruism, the generally held view mentioned above. 
Further, Strand (2007) derives the important result that individual i generally will 
misrepresent hwtp, in her answer to question II, i.e. 
(3) ∑≠ iwtphwtpi  
This result, which does not depend on bargaining strength between the members (or 
altruism), arises because the household members generally will have different marginal 
valuations of the public good (in terms of the household good). If member i’s marginal 
valuation is higher (lower) than the other household member(s)’, hwtpi will instead be 
higher (lower) than ∑iwtp. Equality will only be achieved in the special case where 
marginal valuations are the same. However, importantly for practical CV research, 
Strand (2007: p541) argues that: “In a large random sample of households, such 
individual valuations should on average represent the respective households correctly, 
only provided answers are truthful”. In other words the true, unobservable mean 
household WTP in a (large) sample ( hwtp ), is equal to the observed mean response to 
question II ( ihwtp ):  
(4) ii iwtpmhwtphwtp ×==   
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Given the definition of hwtp in (1), equality two in (4), where m  is average (adult) 
household size and iiwtp average response to question I in the sample from one random 
household member for each household15, should also follow by approximation for large 
samples16. Equality should also hold if iwtpi’s are added up with respondent-level 
household sizes instead of average household size. We cannot test (3) in our data, since 
we do not have observations of iwtpi from all members of the same household. 
However, through (4) we obtain our second prediction that can be tested. If (4) is 
supported, the implication is that asking WTP questions I or II should be immaterial to 
the welfare estimate, as long as the aggregation is done according to the chosen unit.  
Strand (2007) then extends his model to a situation where the household members 
exhibit various forms of altruism toward each other. He shows that the bias in (3) is 
lower under pure17 or paternalistic18 altruism with respect to the public good than in the 
base case with no altruism. This generally contrasts with the well-known result derived 
within a unitary framework by Quiggin (1998). He finds that summing iwtpi to get a 
measure of hwtp leads to double counting as altruistic individuals when asked WTP 
question I generally fail to count the reduction in welfare for other household 
members19. However, Quiggin’s result, as pointed out by Strand, coincides with a 
                                                 
15
 Note that only in a special case will ∑
=
=
m
1i
i hwtphwtpm1 , i.e. the error in representation of household WTP 
for all members will in general not average out within the same household.   
16
 The approximation of adjusting individual WTP with average household size is also used by Hasler et al (2008). 
17
 Each household member attaches utility to the general utility level of the other 
18
 Members care only about the other members’ utility from consumption of the public good.  
19
 Strand argues that one implication of his results, i.e. in (2), is that it leads to double counting to aggregate hwtpi 
values for each household member as a measure of hwtp, an implication he claims in Quiggin instead is driven by 
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special case where the individual exhibits non-paternalistic altruism, and is asked a 
version of question I where it is specified that only the individual will pay in reduced 
private consumption, and not the other household members – a distinction which 
matters in Strand’s model framework20. Quiggin (1998) also shows that in the absence 
of altruism or when paternalistic altruism only arises with respect to the public good, the 
welfare measure will be invariant to the choice of response unit, i.e. (4) should hold by 
approximation21. Finally, within a fairly general framework that does not depend on the 
type of household allocation model, Munro (2005) shows that if and only if the 
household members pool income, household and individual WTP will be equal, i.e. the 
distinction between response units introduced with WTP questions I and II is 
unnecessary: 
(5) jjii iwtphwtphwtphwtpiwtp ====  , where members i and j are from the same 
household. The result follows directly from the properties of the indirect utility function 
once the utility functions depend on the sum of both individuals’ income. Note that the 
result does not assume altruistic preferences. In this case, summing over individually 
stated WTP for the individuals in the sample would grossly exaggerate hwtp, in contrast 
with (4), as these are really representations of hwtp.  
Empirically derived expectations  
                                                                                                                                               
the assumption of altruism. However, Strand’s argument is somewhat unclear since, in our view, it is iwtpi that is 
aggregated over household members in Quiggin and other studies, not hwtpi.  
20
 Quiggin only has a private and a public good in his model, and not the household good introduced by Strand. 
21
 Quiggin’s interpretation is not directly testable in our data, since he argues that hwtpi is likely to be a biased 
representation of hwtp, unless all members are asked jointly.  
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In addition to the theory above, economics combined with disciplines such as sociology 
and psychology offer empirical findings that can help us better understand the 
relationship between household and individual WTP. In a meta-analysis of CV studies 
of non-timber benefits Lindhjem (2007) finds mean individual WTP to be higher than 
household WTP, a counter-intuitive result from what we have discussed above, i.e.:  
 (6) ii iwtphwtp <     
Lindhjem (2007) suggests that this result may be due to the fact that reference to 
individual or household in the WTP question triggers different “mental accounts” 
(Thaler 1999; Li et al. 2005) or “psychological purses” (Webley 1995) from which the 
payment for the environmental good is drawn. These frequently observed psychological 
phenomena make money non-fungible in practice. Reference to the household may 
discipline the respondent’s WTP as compared to the situation where he is thinking of his 
more generous private consumption budget. The issue becomes more complicated when 
considered within a household context (Winnett and Lewis 1995), but it is likely that 
such anomalies are even more common within households than for single individuals. A 
well-known finding in sociology is that men typically keep a higher share of their 
income for personal consumption than women do for the same income levels (e.g. 
Lundberg et al (1997)) so it is likely that if the mechanism underlying (6) is at work, it 
may be more commonly observed among men. Further, this literature finds that the 
degree of financial integration within a household, from complete income pooling to a 
separate finances, strongly influences household consumption decisions in general (Pahl 
1995) and household vs. individual WTP in particular (Delaney and O’Toole (In 
Press)). Delaney and O’Toole (2004) find that a range of household and respondent 
characteristics explain how people perceive their agency when stating WTP for public 
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service broadcasting in Ireland, in response to a WTP question where unit is not 
specified. Being married, having children and being female are factors that suggest 
people respond as households rather than as individuals. Further, bargaining strength 
between members in a household, typically measured as relative income of partners, has 
been shown to influence household consumption decisions in various ways (Dosman 
and Adamowicz 2006). Strand (2007) shows that the difference in (2) above will be 
larger for members with low bargaining power.  
The CV literature also suggests there are many respondent characteristics, often not 
directly derived from standard economic theory, that may explain variation in WTP. For 
example, preferences are sometimes shown to be different between women and men 
(Teal and Loomis 2000) and between people with or without children (Dupont 2004). 
Some of these variables can explain variation in WTP, but may importantly also, as 
pointed out by Delaney and O’Toole (2006), influence the self-perceived unit of 
response (even if it is explicitly stated in the WTP question) making the demand 
function endogenous. For example, higher WTP for women in a bid function may be 
because women tend to answer the WTP question more with the household in mind than 
as individuals. Including variables based more on empirical observations than well-
established economic-theoretic relationships may help us better understand the 
relationship between household and individual WTP.  
Testing procedure, survey design and data 
Testing procedure 
The theoretical predictions and empirically derived expectations discussed above were 
tested using a 2x2 split sample CV design (see Table 1 below). In sample A the 
respondent first got WTP question II (hwtpi) and then prompted to instead think about 
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personal WTP she got WTP question I (iwtpi). After the second WTP question, the 
respondent was automatically directed in the survey to a question offering 4-6 reasons 
for why hwtpi was higher, lower or the same as iwtpi (see next section, and Appendix 
for details). The design was the same in sample B, except the order of the WTP 
questions and the way the prompt was phrased were reversed (see next section). 
Table 1 Split sample design testing differences in household and individual WTP 
 Sample A Sample B 
1st WTP question i
Ahwtp  
i
Biwtp  
Prompt and 2nd WTP question i
Aiwtp  
i
Bhwtp  
Post elicitation question about reasons for why hwtpi 
was higher, lower or the same as iwtpi 
Yes Yes 
The design allowed us to investigate the hypotheses discussed in the previous section 
(see Table 2 below for summary of these) comparing mean WTP within and between 
the two samples. Giving both questions I and II to the same respondents allows us to 
model the relationship between hwtpi and iwtpi using explanatory variables for 
household and respondent characteristics. 
Table 2 Summary of testable hypotheses of mean individual and household WTP1  
 Within samples (k=sample A, B) Split sample Reference 
H1 i
k
i
k iwtphwtp >   
 
i
B
i
A iwtphwtp >
 
Strand (2007). Eq. (2) 
Basic model 
H2a2 
 
H2b3 
i
kk
i
k iwtpmhwtp ×=
 
∑
=
×=
kn
1i
i
k
i
k
k
i
k iwtpm
n
1hwtp  
i
BB
i
A iwtpmhwtp ×=
 
∑
=
×=
Bn
1i
i
B
i
B
B
i
A iwtpm
n
1hwtp  
Strand (2007). Eq (4) 
Response bias evens out 
in large samples 
H3  
i
k
i
k iwtphwtp =
 
 
i
B
i
A iwtphwtp =  
Munro (2005). Eq. (5) 
Income pooling makes 
units equal 
H4  
i
k
i
k iwtphwtp <
 
 
i
B
i
A iwtphwtp <  
Lindhjem (2007). Eq.(6) 
Explorative, based on 
mental accounting 
Note: 1.Deriving the hypotheses it is reasonably assumed that the relationships discussed on the respondent level 
extend to means of samples. 2. It is somewhat artificial to test this hypothesis between samples for the second 
WTP question as people are expected to anchor their response to the first WTP question. 3. iwtpi is multiplied 
with respondent-level household size ( ikm ) and summed over the sample size (nk). 
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CV survey design and environmental commodity 
The data used for the experiment were collected from an Internet survey as part of a 
large multi-mode CV survey of forest protection in Norway. The government has 
currently protected ca. 1.4% of the productive forest area, which according to most 
biological assessments is too little to protect representative parts of forest habitats and 
endangered biodiversity. There are therefore plans to increase the level of protection, 
based on assessments of costs and benefits. The environmental benefits are primarily 
related to biodiversity (most of which are insects, fungi, mosses and plants) and 
ecosystem protection, though for some people the old-growth forest areas would 
increase recreation benefits. A professional polling firm collected the data in October 
2007 from a pre-recruited nation-wide panel of respondents who had accepted to 
participate in surveys. The recruited respondents are informed by the polling company 
that they alone are supposed to answer the surveys, so there is a higher degree of control 
over who actually answers than can be expected from mail surveys22. The survey was 
designed following similar forest protection surveys well tested and tried in the Nordic 
context (see Lindhjem (2007)), and recent best-practice guidelines in the CV field (e.g. 
Bateman et al (2002), SEPA (2006)). The instrument went through thorough testing in 
focus groups and two small pilots (using both internet and personal interviews).     
The survey first included questions about general use of government money for various 
ends to put the environmental good into a wider perspective, before focusing on the 
respondent’s experience and use of forests in terms of recreational activities, and 
attitudes towards the perceived biological and aesthetical state of forests. Information 
                                                 
22
 However, it cannot be ruled out that some respondents consulted their partner or other household members when 
answering the survey on computers at home.  
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was then presented about number and types of species, and the interplay between 
forestry practices, protection and development of the ecosystem functions and 
biodiversity in forests. Six colour photos of endangered species and forest habitats were 
shown on the screen as well as pie and bar charts of number and percentage of species 
in all types of Norwegian habitats, including forests. The rather complex information 
was broken up with questions to activate the respondent and encourage response. Hard-
to-avoid technical terms in the text (such as “biodiversity”, “ecosystems”, “endangered 
species”, “nature reserve” etc) were explained in boxes that would pop up if respondents 
moved the cursor across underlined words. After this information, respondents were 
presented current forest protection policy (status quo) and future plans. The 
environmental commodity was specified as two forest protection plans of either an 
increase to 2.8% (doubling) or to 10% (possible long-term target), presented together23. 
The text was supplemented with digital, zoomable colour maps of current and future 
forest reserves, and a table giving information about the size of new reserves (in “mål”24 
og km2), location of reserves (2/3 in Southern Norway25), and the improvements in the 
living conditions for main groups of species. The biological information was provided 
by a team of leading biologists in Norway, and checked by foresters to ensure a 
balanced presentation of the status quo and future plans.   
Household and individual WTP elicitation and follow-up probes 
                                                 
23
 The full survey varied the second level of protection for each respondent between 4.5% and 10% for the purpose of 
conducting an external scope test, reported elsewhere. 
24
 Traditional area of measurement in Norway equal to 1/10 hectare. 
25
 Since the exact location of future reserves is not yet decided the existing reserves in Southern Norway were 
increased in size on the maps to the correct relative size (2.8% and 10% of productive forest area, respectively), 
to give the respondent an idea of space requirements.  
  18
The basis for the comparison of hwtpi and iwtpi was the 2.8% protection plan. After the 
information about the two plans, the respondent was given the following text (the bold 
was varied between Samples A and B): 
“We ask you now to consider how much the two alternative plans are worth for your 
household/you. Think through carefully how much the 2.8% plan is worth compared to 
the current situation, before you give your final answer to the next question. Try to 
consider what would be a realistic annual amount given your/your household’s budget. 
You/Your household must choose whether to spend the amount on the forest 
conservation plan, or on other things. What is the most your household/you almost 
certainly is/are willing to pay in an additional annual tax earmarked to a public fund for 
increased forest conservation from today’s level of 1.4% to 2.8% of the productive 
forest area? Choose the highest amount, if anything, your household/you almost 
certainly will pay”. 
People could then indicate their maximum WTP in a payment card (PC) in the form of a 
drop-down menu with a non-linear scale containing 24 amounts (ranging from 0 first to 
NOK 1500026), including “don’t know” (at the end). The amounts where chosen on the 
basis of previous CV studies (e.g. Lindhjem (2007)). PC was chosen as response format 
over dichotomous choice, to avoid yea saying and anchoring (at the expense of 
theoretical incentive compatibility) (Boyle (2003)). PC also lends itself nicely to the 
drop-down menu format very familiar to internet-users. The payment vehicle (an 
earmarked tax to a forest protection fund) was chosen because it is response unit 
neutral, for example compared to an income tax (a potential problem in e.g. Hasler et al 
                                                 
26
 There was also an option to choose “more than 15000”, in which case a box would pop up where the exact amount 
could be specified. 
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2008), is realistic and reduces people’s scepticism that the money would not be spent on 
forest protection. The typical budget reminder, included in most modern CV studies, 
referred either to “your (personal)” or “your household’s budget”. Following the first 
WTP question, the respondent would get the following prompt, before getting the 
second WTP question with response unit changed: “We now ask you if it matters for 
your willingness to pay if you state it for yourself/on behalf of your household or on 
behalf of your household/for yourself.”   
After the second WTP question, respondents were automatically taken to a follow-up 
question asking whether a number of stated reasons were important, not important or 
not relevant for their response to the two questions. The suggested reasons allow the 
respondent to express her considerations regarding her (and her partner’s) preferences 
(for herself, family), budget (individual, household, common), and role in the household 
(e.g. usually paying household expenses). The respondent could also state openly other 
reasons that may have been important. The details of these are given in the Appendix, 
and the descriptive statistics of peoples’ responses given in the next section. The rest of 
the CV survey followed standard procedure, probing into why people answered zero or 
positive, checking their understanding and perceived realism of the scenario and WTP 
questions. The final part collected socio-economic background information, which was 
merged with existing panel information about the respondents and their households.  
Results and analysis 
Mean individual vs household WTP between and within samples 
Before estimating mean WTP the dataset was cleaned. Around 10% of respondents in 
both samples (and for both WTP questions) chose the “don’t know” option in the drop-
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down menu for the PC, while between 20-25% chose zero. There were no significant 
differences in these answers across samples. Since our main aim here is to investigate 
the relationship between household and individual WTP and people’s stated reasons, all 
zeros and “don’t know” responses were therefore removed27. Further, respondents from 
one-person households were taken out. This procedure reduced the samples from around 
400 to 240 observations, each. A comparison of mean values of sample characteristics 
indicated no immediate reason for applying weighting procedures or using covariates in 
the estimation of mean WTP (see Table 7 in the next section). Since the stated WTP 
amounts had a skewed distribution with a long right tail, a log-transformation of WTP 
was applied. Mean WTP for the interval PC data for the two samples and WTP 
questions were estimated following standard procedures given in Cameron and Huppert 
(1989) (see Table 3 below)28 . 
                                                 
27
 A very small number of respondents answered either “0” or “don’t know” on one of the WTP questions and a 
positive number on the other, which suggests that such responses generally were made for reasons unrelated to 
the wording of the question as household or individual WTP. Further, it may me regarded as inconsistent to 
answer a positive WTP on the individual question, and “0” on the household question (while the opposite would 
be possible since the respondent may think other household members have positive WTP). Twice as many men as 
women answered “0” (while “don’t know” was equally distributed), though the share was the same between 
samples. 
28
 We compared a normal and lognormal model with a simple non-parametric survival function using the lower 
bound of the PC intervals. The lognormal model showed a better fit. Mean WTP from this model is given by 
E(WTP)=exp(a +σ2/2), where a and σ are the estimated parameters from the lognormal model. 
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Table 3 Mean annual individual and household WTP for the two samples in Euros 
 Sample A Sample B 
WTP Questions Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI 
1st  i
Ahwtp = 172 (141, 203) iBiwtp = 154 (121, 188) 
2nd  i
Aiwtp = 147 (121, 173) iBhwtp = 237  (182, 292) 
N 239 234 
Note: Estimated using interval regression in STATA 9.2. Confidence intervals were calculated using 1000 bootstrap 
draws with replacement, following Efron (1997). 1 Euro = 8.07 Norwegian Kroner at time of study.   
The response to household WTP (Euro 172) is higher than to the individual WTP (Euro 
152) between the samples for the first question as expected from theory, confirming the 
common view in the CV literature. However, the difference seems not to be significant 
at the 5% level. We ran a likelihood-ratio test to check statistical significance, see (7):  
(7) [ ])LlogL(logLlog2q BAPooledAB +−−= ~χ2 (d. f.) 
where logLA and LogLB refer to the log likelihood values of from the estimated models 
for individual samples, and logLPooledAB is the likelihood value for a pooled model. 
Running the pooled model without a sample dummy, yields a test static )qˆ( of 6.96, 
which allow us to reject that both parameters are equal at the 3% level. However, 
running the same model with a sample dummy yields qˆ =2.12, which means we cannot 
reject that the standard errors are the same at 10% level (i.e. the samples can therefore 
be pooled). The dummy is significant at 2.8% level, indicating confirmation of the one-
sided hypothesis that iBiA iwtphwtp > . However, an extended bootstrap (10000 draws 
with replacement) from each of the sample distributions combined with a simple non-
parametric test of means indicates ca 80% iB
i
A iwtphwtp >  and 20% 
i
B
i
A iwtphwtp ≤ . 
This means that we can reject the hypothesis that household WTP is higher than 
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individual WTP between the samples for the first WTP question29. The confidence 
intervals estimated around the means in Table 3, also indicate that equality cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level. For the second WTP question where response units are 
reversed, respondents in Sample A generally reduce their bids (mean Euro 147) while 
respondents in sample B increase their bids (mean Euro 237), as expected. However, 
this difference is not symmetric, as can be seen from Table 4 below:  
Table 4 Percent of respondents who answered higher, the same or lower on 
household WTP compared to individual WTP question 
 Sample A Sample B 
Higher (hwtpi >iwtpi) 32.6 52.9 
Same  (hwtpi=iwtpi) 59.4 44.4 
Lower (hwtpi< iwtpi) 7.9 2.5 
Total 100% 100% 
Around 53% of sample B increase their bid from iwtpi to hwtpi, while only 33% reduce 
their bids from hwtpi to iwtpi in sample A. The reason for this stickiness downwards is 
not immediately clear. It is possible that some people in Sample A interpreted the hwtpi 
question as an iwtpi question (despite the unit being explicitly stated), and therefore saw 
no reason to reduce their bid in the second question (similar to what was found in 
Delaney and O’Toole In press)30. Another explanation, drawing parallels to psychology 
and the embedding debate in the CV literature where e.g. parts and the whole of a good 
is valued, is that people who value the whole good first and than a part of it, tend to 
keep (or only slightly reduce) their bid faced with new information (Veisten et al. 2004). 
                                                 
29
 This arises because sample B’s distribution has a lower mean, but a higher standard error than sample A’s 
distribution, effects partly outweigh each other in the formula for mean WTP (see previous footnote).    
30
 It was not possible to control whether respondents would take the time and trouble to go back a page in the Internet 
survey to change their response to the first WTP question, when confronted with the second question. We 
included a control sample that only got one hwtpi question. Mean WTP from this sample was almost identical 
with that of Sample A, indicating that this practice was not prevalent in the survey 
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Pairwise t-tests on the difference of bootstrapped mean WTP values between WTP 
questions I and II within each sample were conducted, strongly confirming 
i
k
i
k iwtphwtp > for both samples at the 1% level
31
.  
To check hypotheses H2a&b, we also scaled individually stated WTPs with the number 
of adult household members32 from each respondent’s household and the average 
household size in the samples (see Table 5). For the former case, high and low limits 
from the PC data were multiplied by the household size, and interval regressions rerun. 
For the latter case, previously estimated CI was scaled by the constant average 
household size for each sample. 
Table 5 Individual WTP in Euros scaled up by measures of household size 
Mean adjustment factor Sample A Sample B 
Average household size in sample1 340 382 
Adult members of each respondent’s household   
345 
 
387 
N2 224 218 
Note: 1. Mean household sizes sample A: 2.29, Sample B: 2.41. 2.The sample sizes are lower than in Table 3 since 
the respondent database had some missing values about household size for a few respondents.  
Interestingly, the two methods to adjust individual WTP with household size yield very 
similar results. Compared to the household WTP for sample A in Table 3, adjusting 
individually stated WTP estimates to represent household WTP, yield significant 
overvaluation. iAhwtp is about half of the individual WTP adjusted by household size 
                                                 
31
 95% CI around the mean for this test using bootstrap was estimated at Euros (172, 174) for iAhwtp , (147, 149) 
for iAiwtp , (154, 156) for  
i
Biwtp  and (236, 240) for 
i
Bhwtp .   
32
 Adult members include people above the age of 15. Our dataset did not allow us to easily filter out adults between 
the age of 15 and 18 living with their parents, which would maybe have been the optimal solution. Since we have 
screened out all one-person households, the average household size will naturally be somewhat higher here than 
in the general population.  
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from sample B, contrary to the expectation in equation (4). Also for the second WTP 
question where the majority end up answering hwtpi>iwtpi, there is no equality of mean 
hwtpi and mean adjusted iwtpi within samples. Finally, we can summarize our empirical 
results in Table 6 below.  
Table 6  Summary of empirical results by hypothesis (k=sample A,B) 
 Within samples  Test result Split sample  Test result 
H1 i
k
i
k iwtphwtp >  Supported A&B 
 
i
B
i
A iwtphwtp >  Rejected 
H2a 
 
H2b 
i
kk
i
k iwtpmhwtp ×=  
∑
=
×=
kn
1i
i
k
i
k
k
i
k iwtpm
n
1hwtp  
Rejected A&B 
 
Rejected A&B 
 
i
BB
i
A iwtpmhwtp ×=
 
 
∑
=
×=
Bn
1i
i
B
i
B
B
i
A iwtpm
n
1hwtp  
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
H3 i
k
i
k iwtphwtp =  Rejected A&B 
i
B
i
A iwtphwtp =  Supported 
H4 i
k
i
k iwtphwtp <  Rejected A&B 
i
B
i
A iwtphwtp <  Rejected 
Rejection of H1 and H2 between samples follows from the support to hypothesis H3. 
However, household WTP is significantly higher than individual WTP within each 
sample (i.e. H1 supported), where rejection of H3 and H4 (but not H2) within samples 
logically follows.   
Explaining the relationship between individual and household WTP 
We now turn to trying to explain the observed relationship between individual and 
household WTP. Some explanations are given by the respondents themselves, when 
stating in the follow-up question for each proposed reasons whether it was important, 
not important or not relevant to their choice. Figures 1 and 2 sum up the results for the 
pooled samples, for hwtpi>iwtpi and hwtpi=iwtpi, respectively. Full versions of 
statements respondents considered are given in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1 Percentage of respondents rating given reasons for hwtpi >iwtpi (n=202) 
Pooled samples A & B
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
A1. Both incomes considered
A2. Household members' wish
A3. Children considered specially
A4. Partner's preference 
A5. Partner WTP added 
A6. Doubled individual WTP
A7. Other reason
Important
Not Important
Not relevant
 
The by far most important reason why people state higher household WTP, is that they 
have a larger budget at their disposal and therefore can pay more (80% for reason A1 in 
Figure 1). This means that individuals do not seem to consider the income of adult co-
members as part of their own budget constraint, i.e. income is not pooled. The second 
most important reason (49%) is that the estimated WTP of a partner is added (A5), 
which may be consistent with both a separate and shared economy in practice. The third 
reason (A2) is that respondents think about the household also when answering 
individually (i.e. no generous individual “mental accounts” distort the expected 
relationship between hwtpi and iwtpi). The fourth most important reason is that 
respondents consider children especially when answering the household WTP question 
(A3). This is an indication of some kind of altruistic preferences, which is the traditional 
view of why household WTP may be higher (but as discussed not a necessary condition 
in Strand’s (2007) model). Only 33% state that they have just doubled the individual 
amount since they are from a two-adult household (A6). Finally, it is interesting to note 
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that very few respondents have answered higher household WTP because their partner 
have a stronger preference (higher marginal valuation) for forest conservation than 
themselves (A4). There were no substantial differences in answers to this follow-up 
question between samples A and B. However, reasons A1 and A5 seemed to be more 
important for sample B, and A6 for sample A (all ca 10 percentage points). Some of the 
open answers (A7) pointed to the number of household members (with or without 
reference to use of forests) as important, that individual WTP was calculated as a 
percentage, that assumptions had been made about other members’ WTP, and generally 
that a larger budget is available (supporting A1). 
A similar battery of reasons where offered for hwtpi=iwtpi respondents (see Figure 2). 
The most important reason is that the respondent’s wish concurs with what the 
household would collectively have decided (61%, reason B1 in Figure 2). This is an 
indication of a unitary household model (as judged by the respondent), as is the reason 
almost as many states as important: taking household members into account even when 
answering as an individual (57%, B5). About 50% indicate as important that they have a 
shared economy with their partner (B2), 48% that they are responsible for paying 
household expenses and therefore that it does not matter for their WTP which response 
unit they are asked (B4). Reason B3 was indicated as more important for sample A than 
B (by 12 percentage points), while other reasons had no big difference across samples. 
In their open statements, some respondents had noted that the amount they decided on 
the first question was “an appropriate amount” or “enough”, i.e. that they saw no reason 
to increase or decrease from this amount. This is a reason related to the embedding 
argument discussed above; once the respondents have decided on an amount, they will 
not change in light of new information. Hence, in our dataset there may be a few such 
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responses, where “stickiness” (hwtpi=iwtpi) is not due to reasons related to household 
decision-making. 
Figure 2 Percentage of respondents rating given reasons for hwtpi =iwtpi (n=234)33 
Pooled samples A&B 
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
B1. Single, no children
B2. Shared economy
B3. My wish same as household
B4. I pay common expenses
B5. Individual not indep.
B6. Other reason
Important
Not Important
Not relevant
 
Some respondents also indicated that they made the decisions in their household, i.e. 
similar to the Mitchell and Carson’s “household head”, and therefore hwtpi=iwtpi. Only 
7.9% in sample A and 2.5% in sample B (total of 25 respondents) chose hwtpi<iwtpi. 
Around 50% of these indicated as important that their personal budget was higher 
(reason C1 in Appendix), i.e. indicating “mental accounting” (or possibly separate 
finances). One respondent mentioned separate finances as important, another that it was 
easier to answer the individual question than assuming WTP for the other members.  
                                                 
33
 One-person households without children were taken out. Still, 7% had indicated that being single and having no 
children (B1) was important. This may be due to the fact that the CV data generally are more updated than the 
Internet panel information. Further, some of the responses may be due to misunderstanding or “random answers”, 
in any case a low number giving us some degree of confidence in people’s responses.    
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We also posed the question of whether household and respondent characteristics, 
defined in Table 7 below, can explain the relationship between individual and 
household WTP. We do not rule out a priori that a range of respondent variables (e.g. 
sex, age, education, use, attitudes, etc) often included in CV bid functions (see e.g. 
Banzhaf et al (2007), may also be important to explain the relationship between 
household and individual WTP. These variables may be considered explorative. Of 
household variables we included number of household members, presence of children, 
altruistic attitudes for WTP>0 (latter two crude proxies for altruism), if children (>15 
years) answer the survey, type of residence, whether grocery purchases are jointly 
planned, marital status (latter two crude proxies for economic integration), and the 
respondent’s share of household income (common proxy for bargaining strength).  We 
chose a simple approach with a binary dependent variable of 1 if hwtpi>iwtpi and 0 if 
hwtpi=iwtpi estimated using a standard probit model, similar to the approach in Delaney 
and O’Toole (2004). The few respondents answering hwtpi<iwtpi were excluded for 
simplicity. Models using the WTP ratio (hwtpi/iwtpi) or difference (hwtpi-iwtpi) as 
dependent variables instead of the binary variable, were specified and tested, but gave 
generally lower explanatory power. Being unfamiliar with the task, it is likely that 
respondents had a clearer idea about the direction than the exact magnitude of the 
difference between hwtpi and iwtpi. Using a regression model we can control for the 
different characteristics that are underlying people’s responses and hidden in Figures 1 
and 2 above.  
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Table 7 Explanatory variables and sample means (st. dev.) samples A and B 
Variables Definition A B 
Respondent characteristics:   
Sex* Dummy: 1 if male, 0 if woman .504 
(.032) 
.512 
(.032) 
Age* Continuous: >15 years 41.2 
(.91) 
41.7 
(.96) 
Incomeind Individual income 2006, Norwegian Kroner 25000 intervals 316912 
(11903) 
312948 
(13597) 
Eduhigh* Dummy: 1 if > 4 years university education; 0 if mid-education .100 
(.019) 
0.119 
(.021) 
Edulow* Dummy: 1 if only primary education; 0 if middle education .075 
(.017) 
.085 
(.018) 
Owner Dummy: 1 if forest owner; 0 if not .306 
(.029) 
.235 
(.027) 
Member Dummy: 1 if member of nature org.; 0 if otherwise  .025 
(.010) 
.038 
(.012) 
Use  Dummy: 1 if forest used for recreation last 12 months; 0 if not .924 
(.017) 
.935 
(.016) 
Highuse Interaction variable: 1 if  >15 times in forest last month and 
“Use”=1; 0 otherwise 
.063 
(.015) 
.136 
(.022) 
Nouse Dummy: 1 if sure not to use proposed forest reserves, 0 if otherwise .172 
(.024) 
.179 
(.025) 
Attax* Dummy: 1 if agree that high taxes ensure public goods; 0 if otherw. .138 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
Altruism Dummy: 1 if respondent indicated as reason for WTP>0 that other 
people can enjoy old growth forests; 0 if otherwise 
.277 
(.029) 
.238 
(.027) 
Household characteristics:   
Relinc Individual income as share of household income .570 
(.015) 
.545 
(.017) 
Childdum* Dummy: 1 if children <15 years of age in household; 0 if otherwise .231 
(.027) 
.227 
(.028) 
Childresp* Dummy: 1 if son/daughter answered questionnaire; 0 otherwise .077 
(.017) 
.080 
(.018) 
Married* Dummy: 1 if married; 0 if previously married/single .596 
(.032) 
.607 
(.032) 
Cohabit* Dummy: 1 if cohabitants; 0 if previously married/single .236 
(.027) 
.209 
(.027) 
Grocery* Dummy: 1if divided responsibility, grocery purchase; 0 if otherw. .454 
(.032) 
.446 
(.033) 
House* Dummy: 1 if detached house; 0 if otherwise .592 
(.032) 
.638 
(.032) 
Hhldmem* Number of adults and children (1-4, 5 or more) 2.98 
(.071) 
3.03 
(.071) 
N**   239 234 
Note: * Variable information taken from Internet panel of respondents. Other variables are from the CV survey. ** 
Some averages based on reduced sample. No weighting was conducted between samples. 
Results for the separate and pooled samples are displayed in Table 8 below. The models 
show reasonable fit to the data, but coefficient estimates should be interpreted with 
caution. For sample A, older people have significantly higher probability to state 
equality, indicating perhaps both for long relationships and for the older generation, the 
difference between the individual and the household gets increasingly blurred.  
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Table 8 Probit models on hwtpi>iwtpi (Y=1) or hwtpi=iwtpi (Y=0) for separate and 
pooled samples  
Independent variables Sample A Sample B Pooled sample (A+B) 
 Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score 
Dummy for sample 
(WTP question order) 
    .482*** 3.69 
       
Respondent variables:       
Sex -.158 -0.73 .387* 1.73 .126 0.85 
Age -.025** -2.34 .004 0.44 -.006 -0.94 
Incomeind 0.000 1.48 0.000** 1.96 0.000*** 2.59 
Eduhigh .166 0.55 .265 0.89 .193 0.96 
Edulow .412 0.96 .670 1.36 .534* 1.76 
Owner -.370 -1.62 .127 0.55 -.013 -0.09 
Member -.439 -0.51 .249 0.44 .214 0.51 
Use .521 1.44 -.040 -0.10 .259 0.99 
Highuse -.404 -0.97 -.120 -0.43 -.145 -0.67 
Nouse -.073 -0.29 -.622** -2.38 -.405** -2.34 
Altruism .163 0.71 .354* 1.66 .198 1.32 
Attax -.095 -0.34 -.503* -1.90 -.375** -2.00 
       
Household variables:       
Relinc -1.362*** -2.16 -2.209*** -3.68 -1.653*** -4.01 
Childdum .453 1.27 -.251 -0.81 -.064 -0.29 
Childresp 1.150* 1.66 .253 0.39 .611 1.38 
Married .842 1.59 -.200 -0.48 .202 0.65 
Cohab .945* 1.86 -.151 -0.36 .348 1.13 
Grocery -.173 -0.84 .005 0.03 -.048 -0.36 
House .054 0.26 -.242 -1.04 -.103 -0.71 
Hhldmem -.374** -2.50 -.022 -0.18 -.104 -1.14 
       
Constant .948 1.11 .944 1.11 .273 0.48 
Log Likelihood  -120.19 -129.82 -260.84 
Pseudo R2 0.1329 0.1419 0.1228 
N 214 219 433 
Note: ***, **, * Indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
The other respondent variables are not significant for sample A. In sample B, men have 
a significantly higher probability than women of answering hwtpi>iwtpi, i.e. women 
may see income pooling as more natural than men. Individual income level has no 
effect (not significant in sample A)34. Interestingly, people who are certain not to visit 
the future forest reserves (variable “Nouse”) have lower probability of separating 
between household and individual WTP (not significant for sample B). It is likely that 
non-users are more likely to misinterpret the iwtpi question as a hwtpi question than user 
                                                 
34
 It may have been more appropriate to categorise the income variable in a few groups, than running the models with 
continuous amounts, though results may not have been very different.   
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with familiarity of the good, in which case the WTP difference will be smaller (see e.g. 
Delaney and O’Toole In press). Another explanation, if indeed respondents have clearly 
understood the response unit, is that a “moral dump” or donation has been made, which 
is less sensitive to unit of response (and, as is often found, to other key dimension of the 
survey instrument, such as scope of the good)35. People who favour a tax to pay for 
public goods (“Attax”) also display smaller WTP differences.  
For the household characteristics, only relative income is significantly negative through 
all three models. A higher share of household income reduces the probability of stating 
hwtpi>iwtpi, as expected. This result is consistent with Strand’s (2007) model of 
bargaining strength, but can simply also be interpreted as an indication of separate 
finances as people’s WTP is strongly correlated with their personal budget constraint. In 
sample A, cohabitants and married have a higher probability of answering hwtpi=iwtpi, 
compared to the base case of single people (with children) and previously married, 
suggesting financial integration. Shared responsibility for grocery purchases suggests 
the same (though not significant). Increasing number of household members (i.e. more 
than 2) reduces the probability of answering hwtpi>iwtpi , through all models (only 
significant for A)36. This suggests that once children are involved, the household is 
more tightly integrated, resulting in smaller differences between household and 
individual WTP. This result runs contrary to the common argument that altruism drives 
a wedge between individual and household WTP. If the alleged effect of altruism is 
present, it may be outweighed by the higher degree of income pooling that emerges 
                                                 
35
 This is more often found in simple CV surveys than in the more detailed and well-tested surveys that have folloeed 
best-practice guidelines. We therefore think the first explanation is more probable for our survey. 
36
 Mere presence of children in the household (i.e. ”Childdum”) did, however, not have a consistent and significant 
effect on response probability. 
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once relationships mature. A few children (>15 years) answered the survey, and these 
generally had a higher probability of answering hwtpi>iwtpi (“Childresp”) as expected 
since they have lower income than their parents. A final point to note is that the dummy 
on WTP question order (i.e. sample) is significantly positive indicating a higher 
probability of hwtpi>iwtpi in sample B. The results of the models give us some degree 
of confidence in the validity of the data, and supplement the insights provided by 
respondents in their stated reasons for differences in household and individual WTP. 
Discussion and conclusions 
The practical implications for aggregate welfare estimates of the choice of response unit 
for WTP – household or individual – in contingent valuation surveys has been largely 
ignored in the literature to date. In this paper we demonstrate that the empirical 
consequence may be substantial noise or bias in welfare estimates. In our CV survey of 
forest protection in Norway, following standard protocols for design and testing, we 
find that people state a higher mean WTP when asked on behalf of the household than 
as individuals in a split sample test, but this difference is not significant at the 5 % level. 
Aggregating WTP over individuals in this case more than doubles the total welfare 
change from forest protection in Norway compared to mean stated household WTP.  
This result runs contrary to Strand’s (2007) collective household decision model, which 
predicts that response unit biases would even out over large samples, i.e. response unit 
is immaterial as long as mean WTP is aggregated consistently over the unit of choice. 
Since we only include respondents with positive WTP and multi-person households in 
our experiment, the distortion in welfare estimates would be somewhat lower for a full 
sample.  
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When people are prompted in the second WTP question to answer for the other response 
unit, an average of 43% decide to state higher household WTP than individual WTP, 
while 52% state the same WTP. More people state higher household WTP if they have 
been asked individual WTP first, i.e. people tend to more easily increase their bids than 
reduce them. Mean household WTP within the same samples is found to be significantly 
higher than individual WTP on the 1% level. 80% of respondents state as an important 
reason for this result that they have a larger budget at their disposal when asked 
household WTP. There are few indications that altruism, though imperfectly measured 
in this study, may be important in explaining that household WTP is higher than 
individual WTP within samples – the commonly held view in the literature (as 
described by Strand (2007)). Instead, degree of financial integration and relevant budget 
constraints seem to be more important. 
Our study is a first attempt to investigate the empirical differences between individual 
and household WTP for one type of environmental good in a particular CV setting – 
where both types of questions could meaningfully be asked. The degree to which our 
results can be generalised to other CV studies, or stated preference research more 
generally, types of goods, survey modes etc is uncertain. For other environmental goods 
of a more quasi-private nature, such as hunting permits, individual WTP questions may 
be the appropriate choice. However, more empirical research is undoubtedly necessary 
within stated preference valuation, to advance the theory of intra-household resource 
allocation and to test it empirically. Recent research interviewing partners and 
households together in choice experiment settings (such as in Bateman and Munro 
(2006), Beharry and Scarpa (2006)) are important contributions. However, since 
interviewing partners or households together never really will be a practical option due 
to excessive costs, empirical work should inform stated preference design, where 
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random individuals typically are asked, with the aim to reduce response unit distortion 
in welfare estimates as much as possible. An important point made by Delaney and 
O’Toole (2006, In press) is that people’s self perceived agency – i.e. their interpretation 
of the unit of the WTP question notwithstanding explicit reference to “household” or 
“individual” – may vary depending on household and respondent characteristics. We 
think the risk of such misunderstandings to some extent may be alleviated by carefully 
designing the survey to be consistent with the chosen response unit. Not only wording 
of the actual WTP question, but the type of good (e.g. extent of non-use values), the 
payment vehicle (e.g. household tax vs income tax), budget reminders and scenario 
descriptions, and even the survey mode37, may give conflicting cues as to the intended 
agency of the respondent. Our results indicate that people may need more information to 
state their WTP reliably for the household or as individuals. Some sort of advance 
notice before the WTP questions (which is recommended e.g. for scope tests – see e.g. 
Bateman et al (2004)), “cheap talk” and definition of “household” may be useful in 
clarifying the intended response unit. These approaches will have to be carefully tested 
not to introduce other, unintended biases, a common experience in the history of CV. 
However, our results suggest that response unit distortions may be sufficiently 
problematic to need fixing. In the meantime, asking household WTP for environmental 
goods of random individuals is the most conservative approach and should be followed, 
even though it may lead to underestimation of welfare change in some situations. 
 
                                                 
37
 People may for example view their agency differently depending on whether they are asked during an intercept at a 
forest site or in a shopping mall compared to filling in a paper questionnaire on their own, family kicthen table. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Given reasons in survey for why respondents chose higher, the same or lower 
household or individual WTP  
How important were the following reasons for you stating a higher/same/lower amount on 
behalf of your household than/as for yourself? 
Answers: Cross “Important, Not Important, or Not Relevant” 
Higher Same Lower 
A1. I took both incomes into 
account when I was asked on 
behalf of the household 
B1. I am single and have no 
children, so there is no difference 
C1. I thought about my 
individual budget and can pay 
more than if I have to take my 
household into consideration 
A2. I take the household 
members’ wishes regarding 
increased forest conservation 
into account even if I consider 
willingness to pay for myself 
alone1 
B2. My partner and I have a 
shared economy, so it does not 
matter if I am asked personally 
or on behalf of my household 
C2. My partner is against more 
forest conservation, so I adjusted 
for that 
A3. I especially consider the 
children when asked on behalf of 
the household 
B3. What the household 
collectively would have decided 
concur with my wish 
C3. I am normally not the one 
paying for our household 
expenses, so I chose a lower 
amount on behalf of my 
household 
A4. My partner is more 
interested in forest conservation 
than I am, so I adjusted for that 
B4. I am normally the one 
paying our household expenses, 
so in practice there is no 
difference if I am asked 
personally or behalf of my 
household 
C4. We have a tight budget for 
household expenses, but my 
personal budget is more generous 
A5. I added what I think my 
partner would be willing to pay 
B5. I take my household 
members into account even if I 
consider willingness to pay for 
myself alone 
 
A6. I doubled my individual 
amount since we are two adults 
in the household 
  
Other reasons that were important? Specify:_______________ 
Note: 1. There was some ambiguity in the interpretation of this reason. The intended meaning is that the respondent 
does not focus on a more generous individual budget “mental account” for iwtpi, but thinks about the whole 
household and therefore goes up from iwtpi to hwtpi.  
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